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Abstract: This study demonstrates the need for a holistic safety-impact assessment of an advanced driver assistance system
(ADAS) and its effect on eye-glance behaviour. It implements a substantial incremental development of the what-if
(counterfactual) simulation methodology, applied to rear-end crashes from the SHRP2 naturalistic driving data. This assessment
combines (i) the impact of the change in drivers’ off-road glance behaviour due to the presence of the ADAS, and (ii) the safety
impact of the ADAS alone. The results illustrate how the safety benefit of forward collision warning and autonomous emergency
braking, in combination with adaptive cruise control (ACC) and driver assist (DA) systems, may almost completely dominate the
safety impact of the longer off-road glances that activated ACC and DA systems may induce. Further, this effect is shown to be
robust to induced system failures. The accuracy of these results is tempered by outlined limitations, which future estimations will
benefit from addressing. On the whole, this study is a further step towards a successively more accurate holistic risk




There are several ways to avoid or mitigate injuries, and even
reduce the number of crashes on our roads. Advanced driver
assistance systems (ADASs; [1]) in vehicles typically aim to
increase safety by avoiding crashes or mitigating their
consequences by, for example, lowering the impact speeds.
Actually, increased safety can be achieved by risk-, threat- and
injury management. In risk management, ADASs support the
driver to avoid threats, while in threat management, the critical
situation has arisen and there is an ongoing threat that the ADAS
supports the driver to avoid crashing or mitigate its consequences
(e.g. lower the impact speed). Some ADASs are primarily for
comfort or convenience, to reduce strain from driving. Such
systems include adaptive cruise control (ACC, [2]), which keeps
the headway to a lead-vehicle (LV) to a set value by controlling the
vehicle throttle and brake; and lane keep assist (LKA; [3]), which
supports lane keeping through steering control. Today there are
also a variety of ADASs that combine ACC and lane-centring LKA
[3], typically supporting the driver during highway driving.
Hereafter this combination will be called driver assist (DA). Note
that DAs and other convenience systems are also, implicitly or
explicitly, risk management systems— as they are expected to
increase safety—by maintaining better safety margins [2, 4]. A risk
management system (e.g. DA) provides potential safety benefits
from headway, speed and lane maintenance. When a traffic
situation evolves into a critical situation despite this support, the
threat management intervenes. Examples of threat management
systems are forward collision warning (FCW; [5, 6]) and automatic
emergency braking (AEB; [5–7]) systems. FCW warns the driver
of an impending threat ahead in order to redirect the driver's gaze
to the forward scene (the threat). FCW systems only warn (inform)
the driver, and do not intervene by physically controlling the
vehicle. AEB, on the other hand, intervenes automatically, braking
the vehicle hard to avoid crashing with an object in front, or
reducing the impact speed. The benefit of FCW and AEB has been
shown in several studies. Cicchino [6] estimated that police
reported crashes are reduced by 27% with FCW and an additional
23% with AEB. Using a different study approach, Fildes et al. [8]
showed a benefit of AEB of 38% crash reduction. Note, however,
that these are estimates of benefit with systems that are early-on-
market. More modern systems should have much higher
effectiveness as technology is developing [9].
In manual-driving crashes (driving without any risk
management systems that control the vehicle during normal
driving), drivers looking (glancing) away from the forward
roadway have, in a large number of studies, been shown to be a key
crash causation mechanism – especially for rear-end crashes [10–
12]. In these manual driving scenarios, the goal of FCW systems is
to redirect the driver's gaze to the forward roadway [13, 14].
However, ACC (and the ACC component of DA) can also
influence driver glance behaviour. Morando et al. [13] demonstrate
that drivers typically shift their eyes back onto the forward
roadway even before the FCW warning. This is an indication that
the kinematic cue (deceleration) provided by the ACC prompts the
driver to look forward—probably to check what is causing the
unusual braking. In the present study, both the FCW warning and
the kinematic cue from ACC/DA are modelled to redirect gaze
towards the forward roadway [13].
Drivers glancing off-road are a key crash causation mechanism.
As a result, there are government guidelines [15, 16] and other
policy documents [17] that provide metrics for what is considered
safe. For example, the national highway traffic safety
administrations (NHTSA) distraction guidelines proscribe that
glance durations while performing secondary activities are kept
within 12 s total off-road glance time with glances primarily below
2 s individual glance duration. These guidelines can be traced back
to early work in the glance-behaviour research domain by
Rockwell [18], who presented a distribution of off-road glance
durations associated with manual FM-radio tuning. The Rockwell
distribution has been used extensively as a reference for glance
behaviour that is considered safe enough (see review in [16, 19]).
Therefore it is also included as a reference in the current study. In
summary, all the available guidelines for ‘safe task engagement’ in
vehicles are based on glance behaviours under manual driving
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conditions (e.g. there were no ADAS systems in 1988).
Consequently, when a specific driver-vehicle-interface (DVI) has
failed to meet the guidelines, that statement is only related to what
is considered safe in manual driving, without any ADAS systems.
Now consider risk management systems such as ACC and DA,
where the vehicle partially controls the throttle and brake (and, for
DA, steering as well). Note that the threat management systems
FCW and AEB are always included in vehicles (packaged together)
with ACC and DA. While using ACC and DA, some studies have
shown glance behaviour changes, summarised here. Analysis of the
large Field Operational Test EuroFOT [13, 20] showed that a
percent road centre (PRC) reduction effect (few eyes on-path)
occurs in steady-state driving with ACC, but that glances do return
on-path in response to vehicle deceleration regulation if the lead
vehicle brakes. In two studies of a large-scale naturalistic driving
eye-glance FOT dataset, no striking differences in aggregate off-
path glance duration distributions were found while using ACC
compared to manual driving, rather the effect of ACC was
characterised by longer glances on the path, yet there was a
decrease in PRC (eyes on the path) [14]. Regarding visual time
sharing, there was a slight tendency towards a higher median total
task time with ACC active compared to manual driving [21]. Other
studies have shown that the activation of risk management systems
such as ACC and DA affects driver glance behaviour by producing
glances off-road tending to be longer and the percent of time spent
looking at the road tends to be less [22, 23].
For example, drivers performing a secondary task such as FM
radio tuning may look at the radio longer when DA is active than
during manual driving. Such a finding would suggest that glance
behaviours from drivers performing secondary tasks like the
standard FM radio tuning task with the DA active may risk failing
to comply with the guidelines. The problem with such a scenario is
that the DA system, together with the always-present FCW and
AEB systems, may actually make the system significantly safer
than the manual driving it is compared to and a holistic approach is
needed to balance potential benefits and disbenefits. The ACC and
DA's tacit influence on the driver's glance behaviour improve
safety by reducing speeds, improving lane-keeping, and redirecting
driver glances to threats [13].
In this study we demonstrate that assessing risk requires
considering the combined impact on the safety of (potential) risks
associated with glance behaviours induced by the presence of a risk
management system and the (potential) benefits of such a system
on safety associated with improved safety margin maintenance.
There are, however, no studies that consider this combined effect;
moreover, the current approaches (e.g. current NHTSA test
procedure) for assessing glance-related risks cannot capture/assess
this combined effect.
How can this combined impact on safety be evaluated?
Actually, there have been several papers in the last few years that
have used computer simulations to assess the impact of the driver
glance behaviour [24–26], or the presence of ADAS [5, 27],
separately, on safety. Thus, it is a natural step to assess the driver
glance behaviour and the presence of ADAS jointly, using what-if,
or counterfactual, computer simulations. This ‘what if’ naming
reflects questions such as ‘What if the car had an FCW and AEB
instead?’ and ‘What if the driver would have glanced off-road in
this way instead?’. The what-if simulation is assessed using
existing crashes or near-crashes, such as those collected from
naturalistic driving data [24, 25], event data recorders [28], crash
reconstruction [29, 30], and even, time-series data from everyday
driving [25, 31].
Although some may argue that using computer simulations for
safety assessment is less valid, than, for example, using controlled
experiments but limitations exist with both methods. To address the
validity of using simulations, it is useful to consider the state-of-
the-art in the domain of passive safety (injury management,
protecting the occupants of the car from injury and death after a
crash; [32, 33]). Computer simulations are currently used to
evaluate a wide range of functionality from individual vehicle
components to complete vehicle structures [34, 35]. Although the
use of computer simulations to aid the product design process in
the passive-safety domain is more mature than their use in ADAS
design and evaluation, evaluations of the impact of ADAS on
driver pre-crash behaviour is quickly developing. Analogous to
development of human body models (HBM; [36]) – computer
modelling of the (physical) human for use in crash simulations – so
too can we expect the development of driver models in what-if
crash-avoidance simulations.
A recent position paper [37] on human factors for automated
vehicles from the EU project Coordination of Automated Road
Transport Deployment for Europe (CARTRE) identifies
simulations as an ideal for the assessment of vehicle automation.
Also, Bellet et al. [38] contributes to the virtual assessment of
vehicle automation by the outlining a high-level framework that
combine models of driver's cognition with ADAS and automated
vehicles for holistic assessment.
In sum, as computer simulations incrementally improve, their
validity improves through calibration with results from
experiments, naturalistic data, and crash databases. The use of
simulation is particularly essential when there are few, or even no,
other available methods to assess an effect; this, we argue, is the
case for the combined effect of driver glance behaviour and the
presence of an ADAS.
1.2 Aim
This study has two aims: (i) to demonstrate the need for a holistic
safety-impact assessment of ADAS and (ii) to propose a method
for carrying out this assessment. ‘Holistic safety impact’ here
means the combination of (i) the impact of the change in drivers’
off-road glance behaviour due to the presence of the ADAS on,
with (ii) the safety impact of the ADAS alone (e.g. by
autobraking).
To accomplish these aims, this study demonstrates the estimated
combined impact on crash risk of a set of ADAS (DA, ACC, FCW,
and AEB), with the corresponding off-road glance-distribution
changes due to the presence of those systems.
2 Method and materials
This study used the same dataset and fundamental simulation
method as in [26]. The following sections summarise the approach,
providing the most important details; for further information, such
as signal processing, crash selection, data reduction, and detailed
FCW and AEB algorithm implementations, see [26]. After a
description of the data used and a brief description of the ADAS
algorithms used are provided, the what-if simulation approach is
explained and the performed simulations and subsequent analysis
are presented.
2.1 Data
The data used come from the second strategic highway research
program (SHRP2), the world's largest in-vehicle naturalistic
driving study to date [39]. In SHRP2 3247 primary participants
across six sites in the US drove instrumented vehicles a total of
almost 80 million kilometres over two years, as part of their
everyday lives. In addition to everyday uneventful driving, almost
7000 near-crashes and more than 1000 crashes (severity level 1–3,
see [39]) were captured in the recordings. In this study, a subset of
the rear-end crashes from SHRP2 was used, consisting of 34
crashes in which the SHRP2-instrumented car struck a lead vehicle
(see [26] for details). These crashes were a subset of the 46 crashes
used in [11]. The twelve excluded crashes had either missing or
corrupt speed or acceleration data, or the relative acceleration
between the two vehicles was unrealistic (see [24]). Note that due
to missing or poor-quality radar data for several events in the
original SHRP2 dataset [11], manual annotations (performed as
part of [11]) was used to provide data about the relative kinematics
between the two crashing vehicles in the seconds leading up to the
crash. Approximately 12 seconds of time-series data was available
prior to the crash point for this study. Ten Hz time-series data
included the following vehicle (FV) speed and acceleration, the LV
speed and acceleration (relative to the FV), and the distance
between the two vehicles. Based on these data, theta (the vertical
angle formed by the left and right edges of the LV from the
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perspective of the FV driver; [40]), and theta-dot (looming: the
derivative of theta; [40]), were derived. These data for each of the
34 SHRP2 crashes were used to represent original crash kinematics
in the what-if simulations performed in the study.
In the what-if simulations, two additional variables were used:
distribution of the maximum driver deceleration and eyes-off-road
glance distributions (EOFF). The distribution of the maximum
driver decelerations across crashes was the same in this study as in
[26] (Appendix A, Figure A3). The EOFF distributions were
obtained from an on-road experiment (20 drivers drove under nine
conditions; further details to follow) and the aforementioned
Rockwell radio-tuning task (as a task used as a reference for
‘acceptable risk’; [19]). Also, for comparison, Fig. 1 shows the
cumulative off-road glance distributions of these ten off-road
glance distributions (all drivers in the study pooled). The off-road
glances of manual driving are below the Rockwell (cumulative)
reference distribution (across tasks), while the off-road glances for
all tasks in the ACC and DA driving condition in part have longer
off-road glances than the reference distribution. Within each
driving condition, a baseline has shorter off-road glances than FM
radio tuning, which in turn has shorter off-road glances than USB
song selection. These cumulative distributions are in line with
previous findings (see [13, 14, 16, 21]).
2.2 On-road experiment
Twenty participants (nine women and 11 men) aged between 27
and 62 drove a Volvo MY2016 XC90 on the main highway in the
Göteborg area. Drivers were recruited through email to Volvo
employees. The selected participants could not be involved in
vehicle development, could not work as test drivers, had not
participated in similar studies before, and had a minimum driving
experience of at least 5000 km during the previous year. The data
collection was performed independent of the current study (as part
of another study). The current study was designed and executed
after the completion of the data collection, reusing existing data.
All participants were first given information about the study,
and after agreeing to participate, signed informed consent and
filled in a demographics questionnaire. Once in the car, they
underwent a learning session, as described in ‘Test participant
training recommendations’ in the NHTSA-guidelines [16], in order
to familiarise them with the secondary tasks and the specific way
those tasks should be performed. Participants were also introduced
to the ADAS-systems, if needed. They then drove the car with the
test leader, to get a first-hand feel of the car and systems in traffic.
A test-leader manual was used to ensure that all participants
experienced the same procedure.
When the participants were comfortable with the setup, the eye
tracker (Smart Eye Pro 6.0) calibration was performed and the
participants had the opportunity to repeat the tasks a final time with
the test leader present. Then the participant drove alone from the
preparation location towards the starting point on the E6 highway
from Gothenburg to the city of Kungälv. The drivers were
instructed to drive to Kungälv and back on the same road.
While driving, an indication of which task was next to be
performed was read by the participant on an iPad (e.g. ‘USB task
now’). They informed the test participants which route to drive,
which ADAS modality to drive in, and which secondary tasks to
perform. The three ADAS modalities were: manual driving,
driving with ACC, and driving with a DA (in this case the Volvo
Pilot Assist system). After the iPad instructed participants which
ADAS modality to use, the participants themselves chose when to
step to the next instructions on the iPad: that is, initiation and
performance of the secondary task were self-paced. After all tasks
had been completed for an ADAS modality, the participant self-
rated driving performance on a 1–7 scale on the iPad, and
answered the three SAM-scale ratings [41] (part of the original
study, for which the data collection was designed – these were not
used in the current study).
The radio task involved changing from one radio station to
another with a manual tuning slide bar. USB song selection
involved finding and selecting a song from a stored list.
A forty-second long data segment, starting 30 seconds after the
completion of the last task in each ADAS modality, was used as a
baseline for that modality.
2.3 What-if simulation design
2.3.1 What-if simulation overview: What-if simulations can be
performed in a variety of ways. This study used the same approach
as in [26], consisting of six steps (the steps are described in more
detail later in this section). First, the crashes to be used as original
crashes are identified. These should have kinematic time-series
data (speed and acceleration) of both the FV and the LV, as well as
the range between the two, up until the crash point. Second, for
each original crash, any evasive manoeuvre made by the FV is
removed, and the LV kinematics are extrapolated beyond the crash
point (see Fig. 2). These crashes, now called seed crashes,
correspond to what the original crash would have been if the FV
driver had not performed any avoidance manoeuvre. Third, (in this
study) 200 samples are drawn from the EOFF glance-duration
distribution for the glance behaviour being studied (e.g. the
behaviour associated with DA FM radio tuning; Fig. 1). Fourth, a
model is used to simulate counterfactual (‘what if the driver
glanced away here’) off-road glances; it positions the sampled
(what-if) off-road glance in the time-series according to a glance
placement model. The output from this step is a time-series of an
event as if it was collected in an experiment, with the kinematics of
the FV and the LV, and the (last) glance behaviour of the driver of
the FV. In an experiment, the drivers’ off-road glance timing and
duration can be captured with an eye-tracker system, while here the
combination of the kinematics and the off-road glances is based on
the stochastic selection of off-road glance durations, and an off-
Fig. 1  Cumulative glance off-road distributions from the aggregation of 20
drivers’ behaviours under nine experimental conditions, with the Rockwell
[18] radio tuning task as a reference
 
Fig. 2  Illustration of the original kinematics (left), and seed crash (right)
with the FV's evasive manoeuvre removed, and the LV speed extrapolated
beyond the crash
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road glance placement model (wherein the time-series the off-road
glance should be placed, see 2.3.3 and [24, 26] for further
description). Fifth, what-if simulations are performed for each
combination of seed crash and off-road glance sample, using a
model of the driver's response process to a critical event. The
response-process model for the driver includes the timing of
braking initiation, the jerk, and the maximum deceleration. Each
what-if simulation will either be a crash or a near-crash (Fig. 3). 
Sixth, and finally, the proportion of crashes out of the total number
of simulations is calculated: this is the crash risk metric specific to
the off-road glance distribution being studied. Using this approach,
different off-road glance distributions can be compared by
comparing crash risk estimates (proportions of crashes in the
simulations) between the distributions.
The addition of ADAS systems in the simulation process model
means that the combined effect of the glance and the ADAS can be
evaluated. In this combined model, the FCW, ACC, and DA
systems redirect the driver's off-road glance (the glance sample
placed in the time-series) in different ways, according to their
respective glance-redirect model. Then the driver-response process
model is activated, so braking occurs when the model indicates the
driver would have braked. For AEB, when the AEB-algorithm
trigger threshold has been reached, the deceleration associated with
the AEB is applied to the FV. It is thus possible to compare the
various combinations (of off-road glance behaviours and ADAS)
with respect to estimated crash risk. The following sections
describe this study's what-if simulation components in more detail.
2.3.2 Creating seed crashes: The 34 original crashes were
identified and converted into seed crashes by removing the evasive
manoeuvre for the FV. The speed of the LV was extrapolated
beyond the crash point (Fig. 2), so that simulated driver and ADAS
brake responses would not be influenced by the driver's response in
the original crash. Seed crashes have the same initial kinematics as
the original crashes without the original FV responses to the
critical event (see [26], for details).
2.3.3 Applying off-road glances to the seed crashes: For
quality assurance, all glance time-series produced by the eye-
tracker were manually inspected for quality and when the eye-
tracking quality was not sufficient, the gaps were manually
annotated using the following general rules: (i) driver gaze was
annotated from the start of the task to the end of the task, (ii)
transitions were coded as part of the previous glance, (iii) blinks
were not taken into account in the annotations (if a test participant
moved their gaze off path during a blink, the glance was annotated
as off-road from the point in time when the test participant's eyes
were closed), and (iv) whether a test participant was looking on or
off-path was subjectively determined through video data of the
drivers’ eyes.
After quality assurance, samples from the off-road glance
distributions were applied to the seed crashes (Fig. 3). Two
hundred EOFF glance durations were sampled, using a Monte
Carlo sampling approach, from the distribution being evaluated
(each of ten different glance behaviours used in this study,
respectively; see Fig. 1). Each sampled off-road glance was applied
to every one of the 34 seed crashes, creating a total of 6800
simulations. ‘Applying’ a glance means placing it in the time-
series, simulating an off-road glance by the driver during that time
—instead of replicating what the driver actually did in the original
crash event.
For the simulation to be valid, it is necessary to place the off-
road glance at a realistic time point in the time-series data. From
the few models which do this (e.g. [24, 25]), we chose the same
glance placement model as in [26], model F. This glance placement
model is based on studies addressing the question: ‘After how
much looming (what value for thetadot) do drivers start reacting to
critical situations?’ The model assumes that there is an equal
probability of initiating/not initiating a task when thetadot is lower
than 0.01 rad/s; however, when thetadot is greater than 0.01 rad/s,
drivers would not initiate any task (or perform any off-road
glance). Thus, according to this model, only glances that overlap
thetadot equal to 0.01 rad/s matter, and placement of the glance in
the time series is then conditioned by this overlap.
Glances overlapping thetadot = 0.01 rad/s were simulated with
the process described here. First, a sample (TEOFF; one of the 200)
was drawn from the eyes-off-road glance distribution being
studied. Second, a random value from the range [0, TEOFF] was
drawn. This duration was then placed in the kinematic time-series,
starting at the point in time where thetadot reached 0.01 rad/s. This
simulates equal probability of a glance overlapping thetadot 0.01 
rad/s during TEOFF (note that there are statistical techniques that
facilitate the overlapping approach analytically (see [24] for one
such implementation), but here the pragmatic empirical sampling
approach was used for clarity).
2.3.4 Driver response model: Like the glance-placement model,
the driver-response model was the same one used in [26], model F.
A brief overview of this response model follows.
As described previously, in this study we assume that there is an
equal probability of glancing away before thetadot = 0.01 rad/s—
the threshold based on [42], but when this threshold is reached the
driver never looks away and reacts as fast as possible. The
response timing is thus kinematically dependent. Further, the time
to respond to the visual stimuli of the LV looming was set to 0.5 s,
also based on [42]. The driver response model must, for
completeness, consider two cases. In the first, the driver is looking
at the road when thetadot reaches 0.01 rad/s, and the model
assumes that the driver starts braking 0.5 s after the threshold is
reached. However, since this implementation ignores on-road
glances, this case is not relevant. In the second case, which is the
one considered for this study, when there is an EOFF overlapping
thetadot = 0.01 rad/s, it is assumed that the driver starts braking 0.5 
s after having looked back on the road.
The driver response model handled FCW warnings in the
following way: If drivers were gazing off-road at the time of the
warning, they were assumed to look back on the road
instantaneously—after which the response model described above
took over (‘if thetadot>0.01 rad/s, start braking 0.5 s after’). If the
drivers’ eyes were on the road at the time of the warning, the
original response model was used (not relevant for the current
implementation).
In this study it is assumed that the driver's only avoidance
manoeuvre is braking (not steering). The deceleration profile is
based on the kinematically dependent jerk (deceleration derivative)
found in [42], and a sample of from the maximum deceleration
distribution [26]. A sample each of the 200 simulations of eyes-off-
road glances (see above).
Fig. 3  Representation of the what-if simulation process for assessing the
impact of drivers’ off-road glance distributions on crash risk
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2.3.5 Automatic emergency braking: The AEB algorithm is the
same one as in [26], which is based on the threat-assessment AEB
algorithm described in [7]. The AEB algorithm used here takes the
current (instantaneous) FV and LV speeds and accelerations,
together with the distance between the two vehicles, to model the
future states of both vehicles. The deceleration required to stop the
FV before it crashes into the LV is calculated for each time point
and compared to a threshold (AEB algorithm parameter; here 7 m/
s2). If the threshold is reached, the AEB is activated and the vehicle
brakes.
2.3.6 Forward collision warning: The FCW algorithm, too, is the
same as in [26], which in turn is based on the threat assessment
AEB algorithm described in [7]. The only two differences between
the AEB and FCW models are the threshold value (2.3 m/s2 for
FCW and 7 m/s2 for AEB), and the fact that the AEB model
simulated a braking intervention and the FCW model only
simulated a warning to the driver.
2.3.7 Adaptive cruise control and DA: Neither ACC nor DA
were modelled (implemented) to control the vehicle at any time
(neither braking nor steering), but both were modelled to redirect
glances to the forward roadway. That is, based on [13], when ACC
or DA was active, it was assumed that the driver did not look off-
road after TTC–1 0.21 s–1 (i.e. if the driver had the eyes off the road
when TTC−1 reached 0.21 s–1, glances were assumed to be on-road
after that). Morando et al. [13] demonstrate that the kinematic cues
of ACC typically redirect driver glances back to the roadway no
later than (approximately) TTC–1 = 0.21 s–1.
2.4 Performed what-if simulations
In this study, two sets of what-if simulations were performed. The
aim of the first set of simulations was to demonstrate the need to
consider off-road glance behaviours and ADAS systems in
combination when assessing a specific task or driver-vehicle
interface, rather than the off-road glance behaviours alone. To
create the simulations, combinations of the four different ADAS
modalities and the ten different driver off-road glance distributions
were what-if simulated (40 conditions; Fig. 4). The four modalities
were manual driving (no system), FCW and AEB in manual
driving, adaptive cruise control with FCW and AEB, and DA with
FCW and AEB, respectively (columns in Fig. 4). The ten driver
glance behaviours comprised baseline and two secondary tasks
(rows in Table 1) for each of the ADAS modalities (including the
ADAS modality manual driving (no system) which was not
included in the on-road experiment). As noted, the baseline for
each modality was the 40 s of no-task driving after the end of the
last task for that modality in the experiment. The two tasks studied
here were (modern, touch-screen based) FM-tuning, and USB song
selection (additional tasks were analysed in the study, but results
from those are not reported here).
Out of these 40 what-if simulations, only three (marked in dark
grey as Factual in Fig. 4) were estimating the actual risk associated
with the specific driving conditions the drivers were exposed to.
That is, these three simulations used the glance behaviours that
were recorded in the on-road experiment in each of the ADAS
modalities. In addition, 37 simulations were performed (Fig. 4)
where there was no corresponding glance/ADAS-modality
combination in the on-road experiment. Such simulations are
hereafter called non-existent. For example, the top row in Fig. 4
describes the simulations combining glance behaviours from the
Rockwell [18] task with the four ADAS modalities. These
simulations evaluate the risks of driving in the four ADAS
modalities, had the driver's off-road glances been exactly like those
in the Rockwell [18] study. Similarly, column one in Fig. 4
describes simulations in which the driver performed off-road
glances as in each of the ten tasks/baselines without an ADAS. In
this study we argue that this column's (manual driving without any
ADAS) simulations are particularly unrealistic, especially the
estimated risks associated with the glance behaviours that are
directly influenced by the presence of active support systems (ACC
and DA, the bottom six rows in the no system column in Fig. 4).
Those simulations ignore the fact that those glance behaviours are
directly related in response to systems that also may provide a
safety benefit and therefore should be considered in a holistic
manner.
The results from the simulations in the twelve cells of FM
tuning in combination with the four ADAS modalities (Fig. 4) are
presented as box plots, together with their respective means. The
estimation of risk for the Rockwell glance behaviour without any
ADAS (leftmost top cell in Fig. 4) is also included in all boxplots,
as a reference.
The results from the first set of simulations were analysed from
several different perspectives—primarily based on the box-plots of
the what-if estimated risks across drivers for different combinations
of the 40 cells, but student t-tests were also used. A conservative
alpha of 0.001 was used in the tests to avoid issues with multiple
testing.
The aim of the second set of simulations was to demonstrate the
impact of different proportions of complete ADAS system failures
on the crash risks, addressing the question ‘How risky is it for the
system to fail in X% of the critical situations assessed through
what-if simulations?’ where X is 0 to 100% in steps of 10%. To
accomplish this, the simulations in the rightmost bottom cell in
Fig. 4 is used as a basis. Those simulations estimated the risk of the
combination of the factual off-road glance distribution produced in
the experiment when the DA system (with FCW and AEB present)
was active. By randomly disabling the ADAS in a range of
different proportions (0–100%) of simulations (of the rightmost
bottom cell in Fig. 4), the impact of system failures on safety was
assessed. Again, the primary assessment was performed by
visualising, describing, and discussing the results represented by
boxplots.
Note that this paper aims to present and discuss a method
concept, rather than make absolute comparisons of risk.
3 Results
Fig. 5 shows the simulation of (modern) FM tuning in all ADAS
modalities in Fig. 4. The manual (no system) modality (column) in
Fig. 5 corresponds to the traditional assessment of off-road glance
duration changes. It is of particular importance to compare the
results of these non-existent combinations of manual (No system)
estimates with the factual simulations of ACC( + FCW + AEB) and
Fig. 4  Conceptual table of 40 what-if simulation conditions, combining
real off-road glance distributions (rows) and ADAS simulations that are
either factual (an ADAS modality in the on-road experiment) or non-
existent (a glance/ADAS-modality combination not a part of the on-road
experiment)
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DA( + FCW + AEB), respectively. The factual risk estimations
show a large reduction compared to the risk estimation for the non-
existent manual (no system) condition for each row –
corresponding to the ADAS safety efficiency in the simulation.
Actually, as soon as FCW + AEB are introduced, crash risks are
drastically reduced (compare the leftmost column of the right panel
with the three rightmost columns; t(36)>11, p < 1·10−9, when
comparing simulations with manual (no system) and simulations
that include FCW + AEB).
However, there is no significant crash risk reduction between
FCW + AEB what-if simulations (second column with boxplots in
Fig. 5), and the risks associated with ACC and DA with FCW + 
AEB (third and fourth column of box plots in Fig. 5), respectively.
Similarly, there is no significant crash risk increase with an
increase in the level of automation, and all simulations with at least
FCW + AEB are far below the Rockwell crash risk.
Fig. 6 demonstrates how complete (and silent) failures of
ADAS can affect the mean crash risk. These failures are on-top of
the system limitations for the specific implementation. The figure
shows the what-if simulated risks of FM radio tuning while the
vehicle is operating in the DA automation mode, with different
proportions of complete FCW + AEB failures. The specific
implementation of the (ideal) FCW + AEB used in this study
reduced the mean crash risk from 100% system failure (no system)
to zero percent failures (working optimally as implemented) by
more than a factor of 10 (>90% reduction). Fig. 6 shows an almost
linear reduction in the effectiveness of FCW + ÁEB between zero
and 100% failures. Similarly, there is an almost linear relationship
between the quartiles (and even the outliers) from no failures to
complete failure. Although with 100% failures there is a slightly
higher risk than with Rockwell, when there is a 90% failure rate the
crash risk is already lower than that of Rockwell. At 60% failures,
all drivers except the outlier still have a crash risk below the
average Rockwell risk.
Between-driver variability varies across tasks and ADAS
modality. For simulations with no system (Fig. 7), the difference in
the standard deviation of crash risk is similar within tasks between
baseline and ACC, while the standard deviation of crash risks of
DA is higher than for both baseline and ACC, for each task. For
DA(FCW + AEB) simulations (Fig. 7), this effect of driver
variability is basically eradicated.
Further, song selection in DA driving has a wider interquartile
range and higher-risk outliers than manual song selection. The
means of the tasks with larger variability are naturally higher, as
Fig. 5  Left panels show the cumulative distributions, across all drivers in the experiment, of off-road glances for (modern) radio tuning, for each of the three
automation modalities (top, manual; middle, ACC driving; bottom, driving with a DA system). The Rockwell radio tuning task off-road glance distribution is
included as a reference in all three left panels. The right panels show the crash risk results of the factual (dark grey boxes) and non-existent what-if
simulations for FM-tuning as boxplots, corresponding to all FM tuning task cells in Table 1. The boxplots represent distributions of crash risk across drivers.
That is, the crash risks have been estimated (simulated) for each individual driver individually – drivers were then combined in the boxplot. The crash risk
associated with all drivers performing the radio task, as documented in Rockwell [18] is shown as a reference
 
Fig. 6  Results from simulations where FCW + AEB were completely
disabled in zero to 100 percent (x axis) of the 6800 simulated events. The
boxplot represents the distribution of crash risks across the 20 drivers. The
risk estimates of manual (no system) driving with Rockwell is shown as a
reference
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risks are constrained in the downward direction (risk cannot be
lower than zero) but not upwards (higher risk) in any practical
sense. The mean crash risks for the modern FM tuning task and the
Rockwell tuning task are similar, although the modern FM tuning
task may be slightly less risky even with 100% failure rate (recall
that this is a condition that could not reasonably even occur as
glance changes associated with DA would not occur if the system
is not active).
4 Discussion
This study develops a method for holistic risk assessment focusing
on the combination of glance behaviour and ADAS safety effects.
It uses what-if computer simulations to (first paper aim)
demonstrate the need for the combined risk assessment of (i) the
effect of off-road glances, and (ii) the effect of ADAS systems
(FCW, AEB, ACC, DA) being present and active when the glance
data was collected. That is, we argue the proposed method and its
future developments are a more accurate way to balance the effects
of glance behaviour and ADAS in a risk assessment (second paper
aim). It follows that making conclusions about risks related to
glance behaviour changes independently of consideration to larger
potential benefits of ADAS would be much less accurate (as
indicated by our results here e.g. Figs. 6–8). What-if simulations
can assess such holistic safety effects and there are other ongoing
efforts in to pursue assessing the combination of driver cognitive
influences (e.g. precautionary behaviours, including glance
behaviours and decisions like speed reduction decisions) and
ADAS [38].
4.1 Holistic risk assessment
Longer off-path glances can be understood and modelled, within
the cognitive neuroscientific predictive processing framework, as
an understandable consequence of a perceived reduction in need to
update that the predictive (generative) model is proceeding
according to the plan (see [43, 44]).
The cumulative off-road glance distributions across tasks and
ADAS modalities in Fig. 1 can be compared with the risk estimates
from what-if simulations in the top panel of Fig. 7. The second
boxplot from the left in the top panel (manual no system row)
shows that the FM radio tuning results are comparable to the
Rockwell reference task but includes a variance (a similar variance
would have been present in the Rockwell task if they would have
published variance). In strong contrast to the crash risk for FM,
song and baseline (bottom panel, Fig. 7) are significantly reduced
to a level much below the manual baseline risk level (top panel,
Fig. 7), across all ADAS modalities (t(34)>15, p < 1·10−9, for all
four tests).
The results of the simulations performed in this study strongly
support the argument that potential risks related to glance
behaviour changes need to be assessed together with the larger
safety benefits from ADASs (FCW, AEB, ACC, and DA). If a
holistic safety assessment is not considered, it may lead to a missed
opportunity to realise the safety benefits of the ADAS. This may, in
turn, potentially lead to the discouragement of the implementation
of safety technology if glance behaviour changes are considered in
isolation.
In contrast to the method we propose, current glance behaviour
assessment methods related to in-vehicle interface interactions do
not consider ADAS effects. For example, the NHTSA distraction
guideline [16] and others [19, 45] are typically based on two main
types of studies: (i) controlled experiments in driving simulators,
on test-tracks, or on-road (see [16] for details), and (ii) studies of
glance behaviour and their relation to the risk of being in a crash or
near-crash [10, 46]. What is common among the studies on which
current guidelines are based (as far as we have been able to
establish) is that they have not addressed the benefits of either risk-
or threat-management ADAS. For example, when the Rockwell
[18] radio task is used as a basis for a distraction guideline, it
ignores the presence of any ADAS in the vehicle—even if the
ADAS being assessed both induces longer glances and improves
safety (e.g. redirects glances).
As FCW and AEB are practically always present when ACC or
a DA system is active, comparisons with and without ACC/DA
should naturally be made with FCW and AEB present; the net risk
change of adding ACC or DA to the FCW and AEB should be
evaluated. In our results, the positive safety impact of FCW/AEB is
much larger than the effect of ACC/DA. Further, effects of longer
glances associated with ACC or DA are overwhelmed by the
positive effects of the threat management systems FCW and AEB.
One argument for the current-practice ‘no system’ assessment,
which is sometimes raised when the necessity of a holistic
approach is presented, is that there may be situations where ADAS
fail. However, in this study we demonstrate (Fig. 6) that what-if
simulations can be used to investigate at what proportion of ADAS
failures in critical events the risks start to approach the risk of some
Fig. 7  These graphs are the results from simulations of the leftmost and the rightmost columns in Figure 4 (as if transposed). A comparison of crash risk
estimation across driver glance-off road distributions of different ADAS modalities, but with the non-existent manual (no system) in the simulations. In
addition, the same is performed with the DA with FCW and AEB systems in the simulations instead. Only the simulation in grey is factual
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reference task/threshold. It is here important to note that it is highly
unlikely that ADAS failures (for example, ACC or AD) would only
occur in critical situations (if the systems fail in critical situations,
it is likely that the system is unreliable also in everyday (normal)
driving). If it is unreliable, it is unlikely that the driver would
continue to feel safe enough to look away longer; he or she would
likely turn the system(s) off and be considerably more attentive.
This is predicted from and modelled in the predictive processing
framework [43]. The likely result would in any case be that the
drivers change back to manual-driving-like glance behaviours.
Consequently, if a risk management driver support system (e.g.
ACC or DA) has any risk-reduction properties, it is unlikely that
ADAS failures would increase the risk associated with ADAS
induced glances, since drivers would change back to manual-
driving like glance behaviours.
4.2 Limitations
This study represents an incremental development of the
methodology towards a successively more accurate holistic risk
assessment which includes driver behavioural responses such as
glances and the safety effects of the ADAS. Previous papers [24,
26] have taken the first steps. Important limitations likely affect the
accuracy, validity, and generalisability of the risk estimations to
absolute crash-risk. Successive improvements will be achieved by
addressing limitations, as outlined below.
Firstly, the small sample (34 crashes) is not likely to be
representative of (and thus not be generalisable to) the population
level (here, rear-end crashes in the US). Interpretations of the
actual absolute estimated risks through the what-if simulations
should be treated with care, if made at all. Future incremental steps
should include a more representative sample.
Secondly, the FCW and AEB used in the simulations are ideal
systems, overperforming compared to the benefits of those systems
in the field according to post-hoc studies. Reasons for the over
performance include that no sensor degradations are included in the
FCW and AEB models, and that the algorithms assume pure rear-
end situations (with 100% overlap between the following and the
lead vehicles). The latter reason is particularly important, as FCW
and AEB algorithms typically generate warnings or interventions
later when this overlap is smaller, as the driver may avoid the
situation by small manual steering interventions. This delay avoids
nuisance warnings and interventions. The combined model of FCW
and AEB that was used likely overestimates risks by a factor of
two, approximately (compare with [24], as well as [6, 8, 29]).
However, even if the FCW and AEB benefits are only half (in line
with [6, 8]) of the benefits estimated in this study's what-if
simulations, the conclusions of this paper stand. Consider, e.g.
Fig. 6, reducing the benefit to half allows ∼30% complete system
failures (on top of the reductions due to sensors etc., present in real
traffic today), for 75% of the drivers to be safer than they would be
having performed Rockwell radio tuning glances during manual
driving. Future studies should incorporate sensor limitations and
scenario constraints into their ADAS models—preferably models
from ADAS production.
Thirdly, the ACC and DA simulations are conservative; they are
likely to produce more crashes than would occur in real life in two
ways. First, the time headway (THW) was not modified (increased)
from the original SHRP2 crash in any of the crashes with ACC or
DA active. Having a very short THW with ACC or DA active is
unrealistic, as an active ACC or DA would have increased the
THW, reducing the risk of a crash. Future studies may choose to
investigate the THW increases resulting from active ACC or DA
systems. Including these increases in this study would likely have
strengthened the main conclusions of the paper – the current
implementation of ACC and DA provides conservative risk
reductions. Second, there is no active control of the vehicle in the
model. In many cases, an active ACC or DAS control would have
initiated a speed reduction before the FCW or AEB was activated.
Future studies should also investigate the effect of active control on
simulations.
The fourth limitation is that context is not considered in either
the collected data or the simulations. For the experiment, the
presence of other road users (including lead vehicles) was not
controlled for. That is, it may be that a driver had no other vehicles
around when initiating a specific task, while the same driver when
performing another task (or a different driver performing the same
task) had other traffic around. This is likely to affect glance
behaviours [47]. For the what-if simulations, there is a fundamental
assumption that all of the tasks have an equal (and constant)
probability of being initiated at all times except after looming
(when thetadot exceeds 0.01 rad/s), when it is assumed that no off-
road glances occur. Both of these context assumptions will affect
the absolute estimates of risk, but they should have little effect on
the main conclusions of the paper: that there is a need for the
combined assessment of behaviour and ADASs. Future studies
should consider context, accounting for the fact that there are
different task initiation constraints for different tasks.
A fifth limitation is the assumption that all drivers will react
directly after a threat is perceived (here operationalised as a brake
reaction 0.5 s after thetadot reaches 0.01 rad/s). This assumption
represents a simplistic driver response mode. One option for
addressing this limitation is to simulate this condition as well,
possibly by running the 6800 simulations of critical events with
(for example) FCW + AEB + DA, but disable the driver brake
response completely for a subset of the simulations. That is, disable
the driver response to brake systems by 0–100% in steps of 10% –
including disabling responses due to FCW, ACC, and DA (thus,
only AEB being active). This would provide a conservative
estimate of risk reductions of DA.
A sixth limitation is that the risk assessments here only include
the rear-end crash scenario. Further studies should expand the
application of the method to a variety of scenarios. To enable this,
more research is needed to modelling driver response processes
and glance behaviours in those other scenarios.
A seventh limitation is that the original crashes used in the
simulations cannot, by definition, include crashes that are unique to
the ADAS modality being studied. For example, DA systems might
create some new crash type by their very existence—that was
previously not there. For the rear-end scenario, it is hard to imagine
such a crash type. However, if it exists, it cannot be analysed with
our method.
An eighth limitation is that this study does not account for
changes in driver behaviour when ADASs are used, other than the
off-road glance behaviour. If, for example, an ADAS would prompt
drivers to drive faster or keep a shorter headway (e.g. [48] shows
reduced headway when driving with anti-lock brakes; ABS), the
potential negative impact on the safety of such an adaptation is not
covered in the current method. However, modifications to the seed
kinematics could incorporate such aspects in the methodology.
There are many other human behaviour changes (e.g. cognitive
under load and overreliance) that may affect driving performance
when ADASs are introduced. The impacts of such ADAS-induced
driver behaviour changes are also currently not addressed in the
method presented here. The research topic of overreliance on
ADAS is currently large and ongoing regarding how best to capture
the effects [49].
A ninth limitation is that the crash risks across tasks were
compared without including the total task time in the calculations.
That is, the exposure component of the risk increase (over baseline
driving) for the total task duration was not taken into consideration
when comparing tasks (see [25, 26] for details). It is possible to
include total task-time-related exposure, but it was not included in
this study as it would have complicated the presentation of the
main conclusions, and would, in any case, have little effect on the
conclusions of the study.
5 Conclusions
Corresponding to the two aims, this study (i) demonstrated the
need for a holistic safety-impact assessment of the ADAS and (ii)
implemented a substantial incremental development of the what-if
(counterfactual) simulation methodology for carrying out such
assessment. The results of the holistic safety impact of the
combination of (i) the impact of the change in drivers’ off-road
glance behaviour due to the presence of the ADAS on, with (ii) the
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safety impact of the ADAS alone illustrates how the safety benefits
of the ADAS may suppress the safety impact of changes in off-
road glances that active assistance systems may produce, well
below what is considered safe glance behaviour (e.g. Rockwell;
[18]). That is, in the application of the method to a small dataset
(for demonstration purposes), the changes to the glance
distributions due to the presence of ADAS were very small in
comparison with the overriding importance of the ADASs. As
outlined in the limitations, the precision of these results should be
seen as a first step approximation that will benefit from addressing
the limitations. The results from the second set of simulations,
which simulated the effect of varying degrees of ADAS failures,
should be reasonably robust in its trends.
This study also demonstrates concerns with assessing glance
behaviours in isolation, without considering the (potential) positive
safety benefit of ADASs. The study has further demonstrated that
the use of what-if (counterfactual) simulations can be one tool that
can assess such combined effects – in a literature review, no other
method to do this prospectively was found.
As a whole, this study is a further step towards a successively
more accurate holistic risk assessment which includes driver
behavioural responses such as glances and the safety effects of the
ADAS. The use of what-if simulations has shown promise in
previous scientific publications (e.g. [5, 24, 26, 27, 29–31, 50]) and
this study provides further evidence of the relevance of the crash
risk metric – demonstrating the usefulness of the methods in
evaluating the combined risk of behaviour and system – a holistic
risk assessment. As the method (and driver response models)
evolves for more complex scenarios, it can be adapted to assess
more complex systems (e.g. urban with cooperative systems) in the
more complex scenarios.
With further evidence of real-life safety, for example,
comparing simulation results with retrospective safety impact
analyses of on-market systems, what-if simulations will be
calibrated to real-life safety outcomes and become an effective
safety tool for prospective assessment of behaviours and safety
systems.
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